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The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory
and Methods
BETH A. SIMMONS Harvard University
DANIEL J. HOPKINS Harvard University
W
e acknowledge the contribution of von Stein (2005) in calling attention to the very real problem
of selection bias in estimating treaty effects. Nonetheless, we dispute both von Stein’s theoretical
andempiricalconclusions.Theoretically,wecontendthattreatiescanbothscreenandconstrain
simultaneously, meaning that ﬁndings of screening do nothing to undermine the claim that treaties
constrain state behavior as well. Empirically, we question von Stein’s estimator on several grounds,
including its strong distributional assumptions and its statistical inconsistency. We then illustrate that
selection bias does not account for much of the difference between Simmons’s (2000) and von Stein’s
(2005) estimated treaty effects, and instead reframe the problem as one of model dependency. Using a
preprocessing matching step to reduce that dependency, we then illustrate treaty effects that are both
substantively and statistically signiﬁcant— –and that are quite close in magnitude to those reported by
Simmons.
S
erious researchers in political science are ﬁnally
beginning to take international legal agreements
as worthy of sustained and rigorous analysis.
Within the last several years, a growing group of schol-
ars is making progress toward understanding the ex-
tent to which international law— –and most speciﬁcally,
the highly public and legal form of commitment rep-
resented in treaties— –can actually shape the decisions
governments make as well as broader outcomes of
normative concern. The theory these studies draw on
is becoming more reﬁned: increasingly scholars are
willing to analyze international legal agreements as a
speciﬁc kind of commitment device. Treaties are the
mostformal“language”governmentshavetofocusthe
expectations of individuals, ﬁrms, and other states that
they seriously intend to keep their word in a particular
policy area. Treaties enhance the reputational effects
thatmayinhereingeneralpolicydeclarations,precisely
because they link performance to a broader principle
that underlies the entire ediﬁce of international law:
pacta sunt servanda— –treaties are to be observed. By
choosing to become a treaty party, governments ante
up a greater reputational stake than would otherwise
be the case.
Estimatingtreatyeffectsisnosimplething,however.
Despite terriﬁc progress in supplementing case stud-
ies with quantitative models that test the generality of
the claim that legal commitments matter, the eviden-
tiaryhurdles and methodological issuesarehighly con-
tested. The most common worry is that treaty effects
are merely reﬂections of underlying state preferences
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rather than evidence of an independent inﬂuence on
behavior (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). This as-
sertion is indeed troubling for those who would like to
believethatgovernmentscanbenudged— –ifonlyatthe
margins— –toward internationally preferred behaviors
by making explicit agreements.
Jana von Stein1 has made an important and so-
phisticated statistical contribution in this regard. Her
strategy is to adapt a Heckman selection model to
reestimate the impact of signing onto Article VIII, the
section of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
Articles of Agreement that prohibits signatories from
restricting their current accounts. As a result, she
argues that we should revise our estimates of the
treaty’s effect downward. Although Simmons (2000,
831) found that the marginal effect of signing onto
Article VIII can be up to 27 percentage points in the
second year after the last restriction, von Stein revises
that estimate to 13 percentage points, although the es-
timated treaty effect remains both substantively and
statistically signiﬁcant.2 Perhaps unintentionally, she
also makes a contribution by showing that Simmons’
original ﬁndings were sensitive to the strategy used to
control for time, a point we develop here.
It would seem natural to apply a Heckman selec-
tion model to the potential problem of treaty selection
bias. Our rejoinder is primarily cautionary. Choosing
to attack selection bias3 statistically rather than the-
oretically and empirically may account for selection
“problems” without shedding much light on them. In
statistical terms, von Stein argues that Article VIII is
1 All references to Jana von Stein refer to von Stein’s article in this
issue of APSR.
2 As compared with Simmons (2000), von Stein also argues that
the estimated treaty effects fade more quickly as the time from the
most recent restriction passes. However, throughout this response,
weemphasizetheresultsintheﬁrstfewyearsafterthelastrestriction,
as the data show these initial years to be the most critical in setting
states on a restriction-free course.
3 To be precise, by “selection bias,” we mean the bias resulting from
the nonrandom assignment of the treatment stemming from both
observable and unobservable sources.
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notrandomlyassignedtocountriesevenconditionalon
observed covariates, and that is indeed problematic.
Theoretically, of course, this is to state the obvious.
Random assignment would imply a theory of frivolous
commitment-making,hardlyamodelonwhichauseful
theory of compliance with legal obligations can be de-
veloped. We know treaty commitment is not random;
that was shown in the original article (Simmons 2000).
It does not follow that treaties are ineffectual. We view
the process of making a treaty commitment as a costly
policy that only a government with intentions to com-
ply would generally be willing to make. Ex ante,f o r
most governments, treaties involve ratiﬁcation costs.4
Government must have— –or assemble— –the basic po-
litical support to announce a change in legal regime
for a particular policy. We should in most cases expect
treaty ratiﬁcation to be more costly ex ante than a mere
policyannouncement,becausetheratiﬁcationcoalition
will have to include not only those who may support
the policy, but also those who want to tie the govern-
ment’s hands through altering the legal (and norma-
tive) setting in which policy is carried out. Because
treaties focus expectations on compliance, ratifying a
treaty without an intent to comply only raises ex post
consistency costs. Indeed, the anticipation of such ex
post costs should in fact contribute to the political op-
position (hence, costs) a government faces ex ante.T h e
bottom line is this: if treaties are commitment devices,
thentheyshouldinfacthaveascreeningeffect,because
only those governments that are willing and think they
will be able to comply should sign on.
It is essential, however, to correct two implications
of von Stein’s discussion of treaty effects. First is the
implication that anticipatory compliance casts doubt
onthecommitmentvalueofthetreatyitself.Thereisno
reasontothinkthisobservedbehaviorundercutsathe-
oryoftheconstrainingpoweroftreaties.Governments
should rationally be concerned about the reputational
costs of inconsistency. To move toward compliance
prior to a formal commitment may reduce the uncer-
taintysurroundingtheabilitytocomplyandisperfectly
consistent with the theory advanced here. In fact, one
shortcoming of the original article might have been
to cast treaty effects too narrowly. If we include the
anticipatory compliance treaties induce, we are likely
to conclude Article VIII has an even more signiﬁcant
impact than Simmons (2000) originally reported.5
Second, and even more worrisome, von Stein’s dis-
cussionsuggeststhatscreeningeffectsandconstraining
effects are somehow mutually exclusive. We disagree.
4 We are here using “ratiﬁcation” in its broad political rather than
narrow legal sense, although for some countries and issue areas they
will be essentially the same.
5 At the same time, we should also point out that for the subset
of observations we employ in our following reestimation, these an-
ticipated effects are far less pronounced than von Stein argues. The
resultspresentedinTable2arequiterepresentative.Whenlookingat
the subset of signatories for which matched nonsignatories are avail-
able for the ﬁrst of the matched datasets, the change in restriction
behavior in the 4 years prior to signing is from restricting 70.5% of
the time to restricting 65.9% of the time. The other matched datasets
produce similar results.
Even for the committed, there may be conditions un-
der which it would be tempting to renege on a treaty
commitment. Many of these conditions will not have
beenfullyanticipatedbythegovernmentorindeedthe
ratifying coalition. But having paid the ex ante costs
of ratiﬁcation, a legally committed government will
still rationally want to avoid the inconsistency costs
of reneging. Our argument is that, facing similar con-
ditions, Article VIII countries will try harder than will
uncommitted countries to avoid restrictions, because
they have staked their reputations on doing so. Screen-
ing and constraining are compatible treaty functions.
The only real question is: how can we distinguish these
effectsempirically?Asweshowinthenextsection,the
estimator offered by von Stein offers some advantages,
but some serious drawbacks as well.
HECKMAN SELECTION MODELS:
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF SELECTION BIAS?
Jana von Stein offers a potential solution to the prob-
lem of selection bias. She assumes that some of the
important factors that explain selection into a treaty
regime are unobservable and adapts a Heckman se-
lection model to cope with that bias stemming from
selection on unobservables. This section takes a close
look at that choice. As is well known, Heckman mod-
els have some important limitations, and we demon-
strate that, in this application, those limitations are
pronounced. But we also believe von Stein has not
conclusively isolated selection effects, and that much
of the difference between her estimates and those in
Simmons’s(2000)originalarticleareduetootherspec-
iﬁcation choices. Having reframed the problem as one
of model dependence, we go on to estimate the impact
of Article VIII using techniques that markedly reduce
model dependence— –hence, that render more reliable
results.
Generic Issues
Heckman selection models6 have enjoyed a recent
burst of popularity in the political science litera-
ture (Berinsky 1999; Lemke and Reed 2001; Reed
2000; Timpone 1998; Vreeland 2003), although polit-
ical methodologists are well aware of the problems
withthisclassofmodels(Sartori2003;Signorino2003).
Research has shown that Heckman-style models share
several important weaknesses, including their sensitiv-
ity to speciﬁcation, possible problems of collinearity,
and heavy reliance on distributional assumptions (Lee
2001; Liao 1995; Sartori; Winship and Mare 1992). For
precisely these reasons, recent methodological work
on selection bias has focused on ﬁnding alternatives to
the Heckman approach, often through semiparametric
or nonparametric models (Heckman et al. 1998; Lee
2001; Sartori 2003; Winship and Morgan 1999). We
6 ForsomeofHeckman’sinitialworkonselectionbias,seeHeckman
1976, 1979.
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explore one such alternative, matching, in the ﬁnal
section of this article.
Theproblemofbeingoverlyreliantondistributional
assumptions is a real issue here. In cases where the
independent variables for the selection and outcome
equations are the same, the standard Heckman se-
lection model is identiﬁed solely on its distributional
assumptions (Sartori 2003). To be sure, von Stein’s
model includes several variables that appear only in
the selection equation, but no theoretical justiﬁcation
is given for why any of those variables is related to
restriction behavior only through its impact on Article
VIII commitment. In other words, it is unclear why
any of those variables is a valid instrument with which
to identify the model. We thus agree with Winship
and Mare (1992, 342) who conclude that “Heckman’s
methodisnopanaceaforselectionproblemsand,when
its assumptions are not met, may yield misleading re-
sults,” a point that is also made by (Lee 1984). The
problem of sensitivity to strong assumptions is espe-
cially pronounced in the case of von Stein’s estimator,
as she adds a second assumption of bivariate normality
toamodelthathasalreadybeencriticizedpreciselyfor
its dependence on distributional assumptions.
An Inconsistent Estimator
An additional concern is speciﬁc to von Stein’s adap-
tation of the Heckman probit. As she notes, she in-
cludes an indicator variable in the selection equation
for observations that occur after a country has signed
onto Article VIII. According to von Stein (??), the
role of this indicator variable is to approximate sur-
vival analysis within a probit model by ensuring that
the “estimated coefﬁcients...are based only on the
values of the independent variables before or in year
t ,” where “t ” refers to the year of signing. However,
this indicator variable violates the non-quasi-complete
separation assumption of logit and probit models: for
probit models to render consistent estimates, they can-
not include any independent variables that are perfect
or quasi-perfect predictors of the dependent variable
(Albert and Anderson 1984; Christmann and
Rousseeuw 2001). Because observations only are
coded as a “1” for this indicator variable if they have
signed onto Article VIII— –and are never coded as “1”
whencountries have notsignedArticleVIII— –theindi-
catorvariableisaquasi-perfectpredictorofthedepen-
dentvariable.Insuchcases,thereisnooverlapbetween
thoseobservationsthatarepredictedtobefailuresand
those predicted to be successes; thus, the maximum
likelihood estimates for the model’s parameters do
not exist. Some computer programs report parameter
estimates under these conditions, but those estimates
are not correct (Christmann and Rousseeuw 2001).
Putdifferently,theinclusionofthisindicatorvariable
means that even asymptotically, von Stein’s estimator
does not converge to the right estimates. One way
to recognize this problem is to see if there are ﬁtted
values that only differ from 0 or 1 by tiny margins,
and indeed, some 1,232 observations are predicted to
sign with a probability above .999999. We conﬁrmed
these suspicions using the Noverlap package in R 2.0.1
(R Development Core Team, 2004; Rousseeuw and
Christmann 2004), which shows that there is no over-
lap when the indicator variable for signatories is in-
cluded. The resulting inconsistency alone should con-
stitute grounds to reject the estimated treaty effects
von Stein presents.
Explaining the Difference in Results:
Selection Bias or Other Model
Dependencies?
We have discussed the generic problems associated
with Heckman selection models, and have argued that
von Stein’s adaptation produces estimates that are sta-
tistically inconsistent. Setting these issues aside, we
now turn to whether von Stein has made a case that ac-
counting for selection bias leads to a drastic revision of
the estimated impact of Article VIII. Simmons (2000)
estimated that Article VIII status makes the country
on average 27 percentage points less likely to place
restrictions,whereasvonSteinestimatesthetreaty’sac-
tual constraining effect to be just 13 percentage points.
von Stein (XX) attributes this gap entirely to selection
bias: as she explains, “selection bias accounts for be-
tween 31% and 95% of the standard probit model’s
estimated effect of the legal commitment on a state’s
propensity to engage in compliant behavior.” But von
Stein has actually made several simultaneous changes
to the original model, and only by disentangling them
canwetrulyunderstandtheextenttowhichSimmons’s
original estimate was driven by selection bias.
First, von Stein has changed the deﬁnition of the
causal effect to be estimated. In a standard one-stage
model, researchers often estimate causal effects by
varyingoneormoreindependentvariableswhileﬁxing
the others to some value and then observing the dif-
ference in simulated values of the dependent variable
under the model (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
In the model proposed by von Stein, we have separate
estimates for the second-stage coefﬁcients of the sig-
natories and the nonsignatories. Instead of varying the
values of key independent variables, then, von Stein
ﬁxes the values of all explanatory variables and varies
the set of coefﬁcients used to calculate the predicted
probabilities. But if this is our strategy for estimat-
ing predicted probabilities, we need to specify ap r i o r i
which values of the independent variables are of inter-
est. Do we care about the effect of the treatment on
the treated population, on the nontreated population,
or on some other group?
von Stein chooses to focus on the effect of the treat-
ment on the nontreated: she generates her estimates of
the impact of Article VIII by measuring the change in
the predicted probability that the mean nonsignatory
will restrict its current account using ﬁrst the nonsigna-
toryandthenthesignatoryoutcomeequations.Butshe
could as easily have chosen to estimate the effect on
the treated population instead. And in fact, when we
estimate the treaty effect by focusing on its impact on
signatories, we ﬁnd that it is on average .04 larger for
countries that restricted their current account in the
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TABLE 1. Estimated Treaty Effects
Selection Model, Selection Model,
ρs and ρn = 0 ρs and ρn Vary
Years Since 95% Conﬁdence 95% Conﬁdence
Last Restriction Mean Interval Mean Interval
0 .137 (.095,.183) .098 (.059,.142)
1 .164 (.026,.308) .129 (−.035,.285)
2 .023 (−.042,.093) .012 (−.057,.088)
3 .021 (−.036,.081) .012 (−.049,.077)
4 .020 (−.029,.072) .011 (−.042,.067)
5 .018 (−.025,.065) .011 (−.036,.059)
6 .017 (−.021,.059) .010 (−.031,.054)
7 .016 (−.019,.055) .010 (−.027,.049)
Note: von Stein makes several modiﬁcations to the model presented by Simmons (2000), and yet
attributes the entire difference between her estimates and Simmons’ estimates to selection bias. By
ﬁxing ρs and ρn at zero and then estimating the effect of signing Article VIII using the model presented
by von Stein, we can observe how much impact selection bias— –as opposed to other changes in how
the effect is modeled— –impact the estimates. The left columns present the estimated impact of Article
VIII in a case where we have imposed the requirement of no selection bias; the right columns are
our replication on von Stein’s estimates. Making this direct comparison while holding other modeling
decisions constant, we see that all else equal, selection bias has only a minor impact on our estimate
of the treaty effect. Accounting for selection bias reduces the estimated effect from .137 to .098 in the
ﬁrst year since the last restriction, and from .164 to .129 in the second year.
past year than the results she reports.7 There is nothing
wrong with the choice to report on this relationship,
but for comparative purposes, she is not reporting es-
timates on exactly the same causal relationship as that
reportedinSimmons2000.Forthosewhomightwishto
implement von Stein’s model in the future, it is critical
to specify ap r i o r iprecisely the causal relationship in
which they are most interested.
Another reason we cannot attribute the full differ-
ence in estimates to selection effects is that von Stein
simultaneously switches from a logit to a probit func-
tional form. This decision alone reduces the mean es-
timated Article VIII impact by .04 for countries that
last restricted 1 year ago. Using the logit model, we
estimate the marginal effect of signing Article VIII
when a country is 1 year from its last restriction as
.26, with a 95% conﬁdence interval from .20 to .32.
When switching to a probit model, however, the esti-
mated mean marginal effect drops to .22, with a 95%
conﬁdence interval from .17 to .27. Again, we have no
problem with this choice, and we recognize the probit
is necessary to generate her speciﬁc selection model.
Our point is simply that her results are driven to some
extent by making different distributional assumptions,
and not by the “problem” of selection bias.
The most substantial difference between von Stein’s
estimate and Simmons’s (2000) estimate comes from
how they deal with time.8 If Simmons had accounted
for time using two dummy variables in the same
7 The marginal effect of the treaty on the mean nonsignatory is
.10, with a 95% conﬁdence interval from .06 to .14. For the mean
signatory, though, the mean marginal effect increases to .14, with a
95% conﬁdence interval from .08 to .19.
8 Asthisnoteisprimaryconcernedaboutselectioneffects,wedonot
enter into an extended discussion about how correctly to handle the
time series issues. The original 2000 article utilized a set of two cubic
splines, generated using Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s BTSCS program
for STATA. von Stein chose to use two dummy variables to control
way that von Stein does (for 0 and for 1 year since
last restriction), the original article would have re-
ported results that differ by only .007 from von Stein’s
for countries that had restricted in the prior year.9
Simmons used splines instead (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998), a reasonable choice but not the only possible
one. We are not accusing von Stein of handling the
time dependence of observations inappropriately. But
if Simmons had used two dummies in the original arti-
cle, von Stein would not have had much of a case for
a research note based on selection bias. Model depen-
dencies, not selection bias, account for much of the gap
between Simmons 2000 and von Stein.
Another way to show that selection bias may not
account for the difference in results is by estimating
separate probit models predicting restrictions for sig-
natories and non-signatories. This is equivalent to esti-
mating von Stein’s selection model while ﬁxing ρs and
ρn both equal to zero. If von Stein is right that selec-
tion bias explains the majority of the change in the
estimated effect, ﬁxing ρs and ρn should lead the esti-
mated Article VIII impact to return to something near
its original estimate as presented in Simmons (2000).
But as the similarity of the two estimates presented in
Table 1 illustrates, that is far from the case. Imposing
for time rather than for splines. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note
that there should not be any substantive difference on the estimate
coefﬁcients, and they mention that they have a slight preference for
using splines over the dummies.
9 Consider countries that are 1 year past their last restriction. The
updatedversionofSimmons’smodelestimatesthemarginaleffectof
beinganArticleVIIIsignatoryas.124,with95%conﬁdenceintervals
running from .08 to .17. The selection model predicts a highly similar
marginal effect of .129, where the 95% conﬁdence interval runs from
−.04 to .29. The two estimates differ, clearly, in their uncertainty.
But they provide nearly identical estimates of the mean Article VIII
impact,aresultthatshouldcauseustobecautiousinconcludingthat
selection bias is what accounts for the differences between Simmons
and von Stein.
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theconditionofnoselectionbias,weobserveestimated
treaty impacts that are only slightly larger than those
reportedbyvonStein.Henceothermodelingdecisions,
including the switch from a logit to a two-stage probit
model and to the use of dummy variables to control
for time, must explain most of the reduction in the
estimated treaty effect.
Even if we accept the smallest available estimates
of the impact of Article VIII— –those that come when
Simmons’s (2000) original model is modiﬁed to con-
trol for time using only two dummy variables instead
of splines— –two points are worth stressing. First, we
dispute von Stein’s conclusion that “a legal commit-
ment to Article VIII appears to have little constrain-
ing power.” Using the smallest estimates presented so
far, 1 year after having restricted its current account, a
country is likely to revert to restrictions with a proba-
bility of .24 if it is a nonsignatory, but just .11 if it has
signed Article VIII. That is a change of over 50% in
the probability of restricting, and it has proven quite
robust— –innotoneofthespeciﬁcationscitedpreviously
does the impact of the treaty become consistently sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. Second, a convincing case has
not been made that selection bias is what accounts for
the bulk of the discrepancy between von Stein’s results
and those reported in Simmons. This becomes appar-
ent only when we conduct a controlled methodological
experiment and change one assumption at a time.
CONTROLLING FOR BIAS: PROPENSITY
SCORE MATCHING
Our theory of how and why international law works
implies that governments do not enter into legal com-
mitments randomly. If they did, commitments would
hardly be credible and markets would have no reason
totakeArticleVIIIcommitmentsseriously.Thetheory
suggeststhattreatiesscreenandconstraint.VonStein’s
estimator does not convincingly show that the screen-
ing effects overwhelm the constraining effects of legal
commitments. Nor does her statistical model advance
ourunderstandingofthefactorsthatleadgovernments
simultaneously to commit and to comply with their
legal obligations, because the bias is attributed partly
to “unobservables.” But we do accept that the inherent
problem of selection bias is potentially very real and
mustbeaddressed.Onlybydoingsowillskepticswarm
up to the idea that treaties not only screen but also
constrain governments’ future behavior.
We advocate the following. Commitment should be
modeledbyusingtheeventhistorystyleofanalysisem-
ployed in the original 2000 article. Every effort should
be made to theorize and to include in the commitment
modelallobservablestheorysuggestsarerelevant,and
an effort should be made to theorize and measure pur-
ported “unobservables” as well. And to estimate the
treaty’s effect on subsequent behavior, we advocate
matching techniques informed by both theory and by
the analysis of the decision to commit to the treaty.
Nonparametric approaches such as matching control
for bias on observables without making the strong
distributional assumptions required by Heckman-type
models. And in recent work, they have demonstrated
their utility when confronting thorny problems re-
lated to nonrandom assignment to treatment as well.
(Harding 2003; Imai, 2005).
Our point of divergence from von Stein is our con-
tention that important inﬂuences on commitment and
compliance can be theorized, observed, and (imper-
fectly) measured. The most reasonable “unobserv-
able” for which we agree it would be desirable to
control is a government’s political will to remove re-
strictions from the current account. If a government
truly is determined to liberalize its economy, then we
should be able to ﬁnd traces of this in policy areas
distinct from but related to the current account. We
shouldexpectagovernmentthatisintentonaprogram
of liberalization— –independent from its Article VIII
commitment— –to implement other policies designed
to liberalize trade and to encourage the freer interna-
tional movement of capital. A number of observable
measures of political will can be used in this context.
We use three. First, a government that has opened up
its economy to capital ﬂows likely has the “political
will” to become integrated into the world economy.
Second, a government that has become a member of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT,
which evolved in 1995 into the World Trade Organi-
zation, or WTO) is also likely to have some “politi-
cal will” to liberalize. And ﬁnally, a government that
is more democratic might pursue economic openness
and eschew restrictions that deny free access to foreign
exchange.10 Democracy was included in the original
(Simmons 2000) model of commitment, and found not
to be a strong inﬂuence. When we reran the original
model, we found that countries that had opened their
capital account were highly likely (hazard ratio = 5.33;
p = .007); GATT/WTO members were possibly likely
(hazard ratio = 2.05; p = .24); and democracies were
less likely a positive inﬂuence on Article VIII adoption
(hazard ratio = 1.05; p = .38). A case can be made
that these measures for political will should be taken
into consideration when trying to determine the effect
of Article VIII on the probability of restricting the
current account.
In this section, we report the effects of Article
VIII on restriction behavior estimated after a pre-
processing matching step (Ho et al. 2004). Matching
prior to performing standard parametric analyses re-
duces or eliminates the bias caused by selection on
observable characteristics.11 It also helps reduce the
model dependency of our estimated effects, which is
especially important given the sensitivity of the esti-
mated effects to modeling decisions that we illustrated
earlier. Using matching prior to implementing vari-
ants of the parametric model in Simmons 2000, we re-
cover estimated treaty effects— –deﬁned as the average
treatment effect— –that are large and robust to model
speciﬁcation.Forinstance,theaveragetreatmenteffect
10 Themeasureusedisthedifferencebetweendemocracyscoresand
autocracy scores, Polity IV dataset.
11 For more on the theoretical foundations of matching, see Abadie
and Imbens 2004, Imbens 2004, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984.
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for countries in the year after signing year is a reduc-
tion of 24.2 percentage points, with a 95% conﬁdence
interval from 3.9 percentage points to 43.1 percent-
age points. That is substantially closer to the estimated
treaty effects of Simmons (2000) than those of von
Stein. Simply put, Article VIII signatories are more
likelytocomplythanarenonsignatoriesthatareidenti-
cal acrossawiderange ofobservedvariables, including
variables designed to proxy for political will.
To perform the matching, we ﬁrst redeﬁned our unit
of observation to be a 6-year period of time during
whichweobserveacountry,ora“country-period.”The
66 treated observations are countries that were Article
VIII signatories for the ﬁrst time in the ﬁfth year of
the observation window.12 This allows us to observe
thecountriesfor4yearspriortosigning,forthesigning
year, and for 1 year following the signing year.13 The
universe of possible control cases includes all 6-year
country-periods that do not overlap with the treated
observations,foratotalof1,634potentialcontrolcases.
For instance, if Algeria never signs over the period of
thedataset,butisobservedfor30years,itoffers25pos-
sible control cases, one for each continuous 6-year pe-
riod.AndifBangladeshsignsin1995,butwasobserved
for 22 years before signing, the 13 prior periods that do
not overlap with the treated observation period might
provide potential control cases in those early years.
This redeﬁnition of the unit of observation would seem
tomarkedlyreduce theamount ofdataavailable tothe
researcher, but in fact it more accurately captures the
transitions that we actually wish to observe— –as well as
the time-dependent structure of the observations.
Because thisredeﬁnition relieson combining 6years
of data, the data become far more sensitive to listwise
deletionasamissingdatastrategy.Wedecided,then,to
impute the missing covariates rather than discard the
entire unit of observation (King et al. 2001) whenever
data were missing. To do so, we used the mix package
(Schafer 2003) in R 1.9.1. As a result, we have not one
but ﬁve datasets, hence, ﬁve sets of matched observa-
tions. Estimating our causal effects across the ﬁve sep-
arate datasets allows us to incorporate the uncertainty
that results from the imputation.
We then estimated a propensity score for each
country-period in the new dataset using MatchIt (Ho
et al. 2004b). A propensity score is the conditional
probability of receiving the treatment (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1984)— –that is, signing on to Article VIII
after the fourth year— –given the observed covariates.
Doing so, we ﬁnd that concerns about selection on ob-
servables are well justiﬁed: the mean propensity score
12 Thedatasetcoverscountriesthrough1997andincludes100transi-
tions into signatory status, but only 66 countries are observed across
the 6-year observation window.
13 Both von Stein’s work and our own suggests that these 6 years are
the most crucial window to isolate treaty effects. von Stein illustrates
that beginning at roughly 4 years before signing, restriction behavior
begins to change, and both von Stein and Simmons (2000) ﬁnd that
the strongest impact of Article VIII is in the ﬁrst few years after last
placingarestriction.Here,wemeasuretheeffectsastheyvaryacross
aunitoftimethatisdifferentandperhapsmoreintuitive.Ratherthan
looking at the effects by when countries placed their last restriction,
we look at the effects as the time from signing increases.
for the signatories is approximately .43, whereas for
the control cases, it is just .02. Most of the cases in our
prospective control group have a very low conditional
probability of receiving the treatment. In other words,
they are simply not comparable to the treated cases.
They are highly unlikely to sign onto Article VIII dur-
ing the observation window, and thus not very useful
in estimating treatment effects.
To identify well-matched control cases from the
1,634 candidates, we then followed the guidelines pro-
posed by Ho et al. (2004a). We matched exactly on
the single most important predictor, the average num-
ber of years of restrictions placed in the 4-year pre-
treatment observation period, and also matched on
the estimated propensity score to achieve approximate
balance on other covariates.14 Of the 66 treated cases,
we were able to match between 42 and 47 depending
on the imputed sample. Initially, we tested for balance
by ensuring that there were no signiﬁcant differences
in the treated and control samples on any of the 19
important covariates.15 There were none. We looked
for imbalanced samples by comparing all the possible
multiplicative interactions of the 19 variables across
the ﬁve matched datasets, and found just ﬁve signiﬁ-
cant differences out of the 1,805 possibilities. We then
generated a list of other potentially unbalanced co-
variates by running sample t-tests and also the more
powerful bootstrap Kolmogorov– –Smirnov test16 using
the“Matching”package(Sekhon2005)onallavailable
Year 1 and Year 4 covariates. Any covariate whose p-
value was under .10 on either test for any of the ﬁve
matched datasets was noted. In all, the samples proved
quitewellbalanced,withjust3to10ofthe37covariates
unbalanced for a given matched dataset. Not only do
we have balance on most of the important predictors
used by Simmons (2000) and von Stein, but we also
have balance on our new measures of “political will”
(capital account openness and GATT/WTO member-
ship). Any estimated treatment effects, then, should be
less vulnerable to concerns about political will as an
omitted variable. And before running any parametric
models, we have already identiﬁed those remaining
confounders that could threaten our inferences.
14 Even after matching, the treated and control groups differ in their
propensity scores, so we used a caliper of .25 standard deviations
to ensure that treated observations were not being matched to very
different control-group observations.
15 Here, “signiﬁcantly different” is deﬁned as any case where the t
statistic comparing the means of the matched treatment and con-
trol groups is greater than 2. The “important covariates” are those
that proved useful in estimating the propensity score. For Year 4
of the observation window— –the year just prior to signing— –these
include restriction behavior, reserve volatility, reserves as a fraction
of GDP, terms of trade volatility, GDP growth, GDP per capita, IMF
surveillance, regional noncompliance, the use of IMF credits, the
country’s democracy score, its capital account openness, its status as
a GATT/WTO member, and the calendar year. Also included in this
test were the years of restriction-free behavior prior to the ﬁrst year
of the observation window, Year 1 gross national product (GNP) per
capita, the number of years from joining the IMF to the beginning
of the observation window, the use of IMF credits in Year 1, and the
propensity score.
16 For more on this test and its application to matched data, see
Abadie 2002, Sekhon and Diamond 2005, and Sekhon 2004.
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TABLE 2. P-Values for t-Tests and Bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
Mean, Mean, t Test KS Test
Treated Control p-Value p-Value
Year 1 Covariates
Restrictions 0.705 0.727 0.816
Years Since Last Restriction 2.159 2.455 0.793 0.976
Flexibility 1.386 1.455 0.523
GNP/Capita 1976.245 1312.445 0.211 0.28
Change in GDP 3.663 3.925 0.896 0.604
Reserves/GDP 0.154 0.093 0.168 0.798
Reserve Volatility −3.19 −3.209 0.906 0.758
Year 1987.023 1987.909 0.52 0.769
Terms of Trade Volatility 3.046 3.18 0.341 0.167
Universal 42.675 43.504 0.4 0.763
Regional Restrictions 34.574 27.698 0.275 0.062
IMF Surveillance 1.864 1.909 0.507
Openness 78.148 82.117 0.758 0.058
GATT/WTO Member 1.705 1.705 1
Balance of Payments/GDP −4.353 −4.187 0.922 0.925
Use of Fund Credits 1.818 1.795 0.79
Years of IMF Membership 25.159 24.795 0.887 0.498
Year 4 Covariates
Restrictions 0.659 0.659 1
Years Since Last Restriction 2.864 3.273 0.761 0.742
Flexibility 1.409 1.614 0.056
GNP per Capita 2369.863 1958.404 0.491 0.916
Change in GDP 4.843 5.781 0.698 0.597
Reserves per GDP 0.172 0.159 0.781 0.301
Reserve Volatility −3.186 −3.234 0.771 0.763
Terms of Trade Volatility 2.991 3.142 0.279 0.113
Universal 48.485 49.482 0.607 0.574
Regional Restrictions 42.14 36.61 0.361 0.092
IMF Surveillance 1.909 1.932 0.698
Openness 79.596 81.073 0.908 0.308
GATT/WTO Member 1.75 1.773 0.805
Balance of Payments/GDP −4.444 −4.001 0.856 0.636
Use of Fund Credits 1.386 1.386 1
Democracy 2.609 1.21 0.334 0.561
Capital Account Openness 1.134 1.114 0.772 0.945
Other Covariates
Average Years of Restrictions,
Years 1– –4 0.705 0.705 1 1
Restrictions, Year 2 0.727 0.705 0.816
Restrictions, Year 3 0.727 0.727 1
Propensity Score 0.328 0.32 0.87 1
Note: This table presents p-values for t-tests and bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the ﬁrst
of our ﬁve matched datasets. As is evident, the matched dataset is balanced on a wide range of
covariates. Deﬁning balance as all p-values higher than .05, these samples are balanced. Using our
stricter criterion of p >.10, only four covariates are potentially unbalanced. And having identiﬁed those
potential confounders, we can include them as explanatory variables in standard parametric models.
As an example of the balance obtained, consider the
ﬁrst of the ﬁve matches: across the 4 years prior to
the potential treatment, the treated group and control
groupareidenticalintermsoftheirrestrictionbehavior
in Years 3 and 4, and differ only very slightly and in-
signiﬁcantly in Years 1 and 2. Or consider the calendar
years of the matched groups. For the treatment group,
the average year when the observation window begins
is 1987, whereas for the control group it is 1988. As
Table 2 makes clear, similarly close matches hold for
the vast majority of variables in both Years 1 and 4 of
theobservationwindow.Andofthe361possiblemulti-
plicative interactions among the 19 key covariates, not
one has a t score greater than 2. For the matched coun-
tries that sign onto Article VIII within the observation
window, we have identiﬁed control cases that are indis-
tinguishable across a wide range of measures, from the
presence or absence of IMF surveillance to the coun-
tries’GNPpercapita.Intermsofallofthevariableswe
have observed in the pretreatment phase, the matched
pairs differ chieﬂy in that the treated group actually
signed on to Article VIII in the ﬁfth year, whereas the
control group did not sign on during the observation
window.
What, then, is the estimated effect of signing Article
VIII? Here, we used probit models to calculate the
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average treatment effect for both the year of signing
and the year after signing. Starting with Simmons’s
(2000) original model, we discarded those explanatory
variables that were no longer approaching signiﬁcance
as predictors and tested those variables that were po-
tentiallyunbalancedinanyoftheﬁvematchedsamples
as described earlier (in this case, Year 4 ﬂexibility, Year
4 openness, and Year 1 regional restrictions). In the
end, we wound up with a model of restriction behavior
that closely approximated that presented by Simmons,
with measures of openness in Year 1, democracy in
Year 4, GATT/WTO status in Year 4, reserve volatility
in Year 4, and an indicator variable marking whether
the country last restricted in the previous year.17 The
estimatedtreatyeffectinthesigningyearisareduction
of 17.7 percentage points, with a 95% conﬁdence inter-
val that runs from −0.7 percent points to 35.6 percent-
age points. For the year after signing, the same model
leads to an estimated effect of 24.2 percentage points,
with a 95% conﬁdence interval from 3.9 percentage
pointsto43.1percentagepoints.AndasHoetal.(2004)
argue, using matching to preprocess the data reduces
model dependency, and so should provide readers with
added conﬁdence that these results are not very sensi-
tivetothespeciﬁcationoftheparametricmodel,apoint
that our own data analyses conﬁrm. These estimates
are quite similar to those reported by Simmons, and
conﬁrm yet again that these estimated treaty effects
are quite robust: they show up consistently across a
wide range of modeling approaches and speciﬁcations.
To be sure, von Stein’s critique is about nonrandom
assignment to treatment owing to both observable and
unobservable selection factors, and matching assumes
that there is no selection on unobserved covariates.
Certainly, though, matching can play a role in nar-
rowing the range of possible unobservables, just as
we demonstrated earlier. And it can also help in an-
other way, even though it does not quantify the degree
of selection on unobservables. By providing us with
paired lists of countries that are highly similar on the
observed covariates, matching allows us to draw upon
knowledge not quantiﬁed within the data.18 Instead
of assuming that latent variables are distributed in a
bivariate normal fashion— –which is certainly not an as-
sumption that researchers can observe in practice— –we
are making the more tangible assumption that each
of our treated countries is similar in all important re-
spects to its matched control. If there is indeed some
unobservable inﬂuence, whether it is political will or
anything else, careful study of the paired list in com-
bination with substantive knowledge of the cases will
help us understand what it might be. This is precisely
what we advocate scholars do. We think this approach
will yield far more insights into the selection effects in
making international legal and other kinds of commit-
ments than will fragile statistical methods that allow
theoretically interesting processes to go unobserved.
17 That is, we adopt the strategy for time dependence employed by
von Stein, although we drop the second indicator variable, as it is
zero across all observations.
18 Ho et al. direct readers to (Rosenbaum 2002) chapter 3 for more
on this point.
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